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S are not P” should rather have been “S does not apply to some P.” At 220 n. 253 the reference to Alexander, “*Top.*125” seems wrong or imprecise. At 844 (cf. 235 n. 18) H. Fränkel 1925 is attributed to E. Fraenkel. At 599 line 12, “that an influence could not come” should be “that an influence could come,” the negative having already preceded in “it is difficult to believe.”

R. W. SHARPLES

University College London

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INSIGHT AND INFERENCE: DESCARTES’S FOUNDING PRINCIPLE AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY. By MURRAY MILES. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999. Pp. xviii, 564.

This long and ambitious work offers a systematic interpretation of Cartesian metaphysics and epistemology from the perspective of Descartes’s so-called founding principle, *cogito ergo sum*. The book is organized around the three parts of this famous dictum, though its scope is much more encompassing. Part 1 offers a careful analysis of the “formal structure” of Cartesian thought, in an effort to identify what is distinctive about the *cogito* and to uncover how Descartes’s theory of mind makes this insight possible. Part 2 addresses the notions of truth and certainty as they relate to the claim “I exist” (*sum* or *existo*). Part 3 tackles one of the most vexed interpretive questions relating to the *cogito*, namely, whether and in what sense “I exist” is inferred from “I think,” as the logical particle *ergo* would seem to suggest. The *cogito* principle, however, is only the lens through which Miles examines Descartes’s larger system. One attractive feature of the project is that he uses this principle to develop what he takes as a key to Descartes’s philosophy—the process of “analytical reflexion” (discussed more fully below) by which knowledge that was previously only implicit is explicitly intuited. This interpretive key is then employed to unlock many of the other major Cartesian themes, including the method of doubt, clear and distinct perception, innate ideas, analytic and synthetic method, the infamous Circle, and the divine creation of the eternal truths. The result is a set of

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extremely scholarly readings of important texts and doctrines that, if not always convincing, is fresh, nuanced, and provocative.

Miles writes with several targets in mind—standard readings of Cartesian doctrines—against which his own views are presented as “heretical.” He thinks that some of the more dubious positions attributed to Descartes were never held by him and that they pose serious obstacles to correct understanding. Some of the book’s principal heresies include the claim that Descartes is a direct realist (rather than a representationalist) in the theory of perception, that the knowing subject is *not* epistemically prior to things known, and that “deductivism” (in the contemporary sense) is not the correct model of Cartesian science. Miles also takes aim against those scholars who would read Descartes as the “first modern idealist and intellectual forebear of all subsequent metaphysical idealisms, especially Kant’s” (5). Miles’ attacks are mostly on target. In addressing the last point, however, he appears to be engaged in a debate that has long been settled.

The heart of Miles’s book is devoted to an explication of the process he variously calls “analytical reflexion,” “reflective analysis,” and “intuitive induction,” which is made possible, he thinks, by the complex internal structure of Cartesian thought. Using a notational device from Husserl and Heidegger, and borrowing heavily from Descartes commentator Robert McRae’s work, Miles delineates four fundamental distinctions that are intended to express thought’s “embracing formal structure.” The first of these is between thought and consciousness, and is reflected in Descartes’s definition of thought as “everything that is within us in such a way that we are immediately conscious of it” (Second Replies, Definition 1; AT 7:160). Miles argues that in thinking we are conscious of both the mental act itself and its various other structures, which include the subject of the thought (the Cartesian *ego*) and the “act-character” of the thought (for example, doubting, perceiving, imagining, etc.).

To claim that we are conscious of these other structures, however, is not to say that we are expressly attending to them. Miles asserts that when we are thinking our attention is typically focused on the extra-mental object of our thought and not the act of thought itself or its internal structures. But because of the mind’s reflexive character, we can direct our attention toward these formal structures and, in so doing, make our thought clear and distinct (72). He calls this process “reflexion.” *Analytical* reflection is simply an extension of this process and involves a temporal movement of attention from one internal structure to another. Miles argues that this movement of mind explains the derivation of “I exist” from “I think” in Descartes’s founding principle. The *cogito* is not a deductive or syllogistic inference but a direct intuitive apprehension in which the mind turns “first to the occurrence of certain modes of thinking, then to the existence of that substance in which they inhere” (281).

Miles’s account of reflection and analytical reflection is clever and has some textual basis, but there are at least two important difficulties with it. First, there

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is the obvious danger of anachronism in appealing to Husserl and Heidegger to shed light on Descartes's analysis of thought. To his credit, Miles confronts this difficulty directly by trying to show how the subtle phenomenological distinctions that we find in twentieth-century theorists can be located in Descartes's own writings in more "cumbersome Scholastic terminology" (92). This effort does not fully succeed, however. The source of the problem is Miles's talk of the "formal structure" of thought. Descartes suggests in some important texts that thought is simple and thus does not have a complex internal structure (See *Principles of Philosophy*, 1.10; AT 8A:8). This does not mean that Descartes did not draw the distinctions that Miles finds in his writings but it does mean that they have a different status than he (Miles) ascribes to them. At least some of them are not phenomenological in the Husserlian sense but "conceptual" or "rational" in a sense more closely tied to Scholastic thought (Descartes borrows more than mere terminology).¹

A second problem concerns Miles's application of the notion of analytic reflection to various Cartesian doctrines. He exaggerates the centrality of this notion and the degree to which it sheds light, in particular, on the theory of innate ideas and the Cartesian method of analysis. It is commonly thought that Descartes held a dispositional theory of innate ideas, according to which it is not the ideas themselves that are innate but the dispositions to form them. In some passages, however, he seems to articulate a second view, which affirms that innate ideas are always present to consciousness but not always present to attention.² Miles reads the first view in terms of the second, and claims that analytical reflection is the process by which we come to attend to these innate but submerged thoughts. Rather than resolving the apparent tension in Descartes's writings, however, this move merely sidesteps it. Some account must be given of the predominant thread in Descartes's writings which is that attaining proficiency in accessing one's innate ideas requires effort and special training, and is not simply a matter of directing one's attention. Miles account of the Cartesian notion of analysis suffers similarly. In the Second Replies, Descartes describes analysis (a method he claims to have used exclusively in writing the *Meditations*) as a means for dispelling philosophical prejudices formed in youth as a result of relying on the senses (AT 7:155f.). Miles describes it instead as a method that begins with particular truths that are intuitively grasped and then proceeds to universal concepts "that careful attention reveals as already implicit in them" (251), in keeping with his view that the method of analysis and the process of analytical reflection are essentially the same (248). This is a

¹For example, the distinction Miles draws between thought and the mind or Cartesian ego is one of the paradigms of a rational distinction (See *Principles of Philosophy* 1.62–63; AT 8A:30–31).

²For more on the tension between these two views see Nicholas Jolley, *The Light of the Soul* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 47f and Margaret Wilson, *Descartes* (New York: Routledge, 1978), 158f.

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plausible account of one aspect of analysis but, as Descartes's remarks in the Second Replies show, not the central feature.

A project of this scope will invariably have its faults and not be fully persuasive in all of its details. The book's strength lies in the breadth of its vision, its meticulous attention to texts, and its mastery of both the French and Anglo-American secondary literature. Those interested in understanding the cogito and Descartes's analysis of mind will profit from its many insights.

LAWRENCE NOLAN

California State University, Long Beach

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THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO MALEBRANCHE. Ed. STEVEN NADLER.
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The absence of Nicolas Malebranche (1638–1715) from the standard rationalism syllabus is less a reflection of his having written too little that was interesting to his successors than of his having written too much that was not. Malebranche was a celebrated and powerful figure whose influence on the operating philosophy of the Paris *Académie des sciences* was considerable. He relayed Cartesian problems to Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, and his rejection of Locke and Hobbes was as important a factor as Leibniz's quarrel with Newton in the divergent evolution of English and Continental philosophy. But his lengthy discussions of the laws of grace, his emotionally over-the-top style, and his hyper-metaphysical participation doctrines won him few modern readers, and Spinoza, whose impact on metaphysics in the seventeenth century was effectively nonexistent, was recruited to form a trio with Descartes and Leibniz. The *Cambridge Companion to Malebranche*, edited by Steven Nadler, is the first collection of articles on Malebranche to appear in English. Though there are weaknesses in the overall conception (discussed below), Nadler, the author of many papers on Malebranche and seventeenth-century metaphysics and a philosophical biography of Spinoza, is to be thanked for assembling and in some cases translating this set of papers by well-known historians.

Interest in Malebranche in Anglo-American philosophy has centered on just three topics: occasional causes, vision in God, and theodicy. The present volume maintains this focus while extending the range to moral and political theory. Occasionalism, the doctrine that finite creatures have no (or only intramental) causal powers and that changes in them are only the occasion of other changes, raises three distinct questions: What was Malebranche's interest in reviving this medieval idea? What formal and informal arguments did he employ for his restrictive notion of causality? How exactly did he intend divine agency to be understood? Bodies cannot make other bodies move, according